

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SANA 2997

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 5. SUBPARA A AND C)

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TAGS: PFOR, MASS, YE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

REF: A) 11 FAM 212.4 B) SANA A-15 DATED APRIL 1, 1975
C) STATE 250025

1. FOLLOWING ARE AMENDMENTS WE WOULD MAKE TO SANA A 15 IN
ACCORDANCE WITH STATE 250025.

2. QUOTE INTRODUCTION UNQUOTE SHOULD BEGIN BY NOTING THAT US
POLICY TOWARDS YEMEN MEETING GROWING SUCCESS. NEW SAUDI POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP HAS INCREASINGLY ENDORSED--AS WE HAVE LONG URGED--
MODERATE AND REFORMIST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OVER TRIBALLY-BASED
CONSERVATIVE INTERESTS FAVORED BY SAG IN THE PAST. INCREASED
SAUDI BUDGET SUPPORT AND MASSIVE NEW ECONOMIC AID COMMITMENTS
FROM SAUDIS AND OTHER OPEC STATES HAVE ECLIPSED COMMUNIST
AID-GIVING. COLLATERALLY, AMERICAN PRESENCE IS GROWING SLOWLY,
THANKS LARGELY TO AID MISSION, AND AS US ARMS SALES BEGIN.
SOVIET INFLUENCE IN YAR WILL BE FURTHER DILUTED. MOST
IMPORTANT, WE SEE GREATER EVIDENCE INTERNAL SECURITY, POLITICAL
STABILITY THAN EVER BEFORE IN YAR AND SIGNS THAT TIDE OF
MODERATION MAY BE WASHING INTO RADICAL PDRY AS WELL. THUS,
ALL RPT ALL GOALS SET IN 1972 AT RESUMPTION US DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH YEMEN HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. BASIC TASK IS TO
MAINTAIN SITUATION AND CARRY THROUGH TO MAKE SUCCESS A LONG
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TERM ONE.

3. INTRODUCTORY SECTION MIGHT ALSO CHANGE A-15 BY NOTING THAT
EVENTS OF LAST SIX MONTHS MAKE IT LOOK AS THOUGH HAMDI HAS

CONSOLIDATED HIS POSITION AS PREEMINENT YEMENI LEADER. THIS WOULD BE WITHOUT PRECEDENT IN MODERN YEMEN, EVEN IMAMS HAD LESS POWER OVER COUNTRY.

A) INTERNALLY, HAMDI HAS DEFTLY OUTMANEUVERED OPPONENTS ON BOTH THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT AND LAUNCHED PROGRAM WHICH HAS PROMISE LONG TERM SUCCESS AND BROAD SUPPORT. PROGRAM CALLS FOR POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND SOCIAL REFORM COUPLED WITH SUBSTANTIVE ATTACK ON SHAYKHLY TRIBAL SYSTEM THROUGH LOCAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WHICH WILL TILT BALANCE IN FAVOR OF MORE LIBERAL AND PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS. TRIBAL LEADERS LIKE ONCE-POWERFUL SHAYKH ABDALLAH BIN HUSAIN AL-AHMAR ARE NOT RPT NOT HAPPY ABOUT THIS. SAUDIS, HAVE HOWEVER UNDERWRITTEN THIS POLICY BY LARGELY ENDING SUBSIDIES TO TRIBES AND INCREASING SUBSIDIES TO YARG FOR BOTH OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT. HAMDI IN RETURN HAS REALIGNED YARG FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SAUDIS AND WEST, MOVING AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL LEFTIST AND THIRD WORLD POSITIONS. CHIEF THREAT NOW TO HAMDI IS NOT RPT NOT SO MUCH ORGANIZED OPPOSITION AS DANGER OF ASSASSINATION BY DISGRUNTLED FORMER POLITICIANS OR TRIBAL LEADERS. IN A LAST DITCH ATTEMPT, AL-AHAMR MAY ATTEMPT TO ACT AS A CATALYST FOR OTHER FORMER LEADERS DISGRUNTLED WITH HAMDI AND HIS EMERGING POLITICAL SYSTEM.

B) EXTERNALLY, STATE VISITS TO SEVERAL REGIONAL COUNTRIES, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, IRAN, THE GULF STATES, AND SUDANESE PRESIDENT NUMAYRI'S RECENT VISIT HERE HAVE FURTHER ESTABLISHED HIM AS RECOGNIZED POLITICAL LEADER OF YEMEN OF BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT WING OF ARAB OPINION. THIS HAS BUTTRESSED HAMDI SUPPORT WITHIN YEMEN.

4. INTRODUCTORY SECTION SHOULD ALSO RESTATE A-15 BY NOTING THAT THERE STILL SOME CONCERN IN SANA THAT SAUDI AND EGYPTIAN ATTEMPT TO "MODERATE" PDRY MAY DIMINISH SAUDI AND WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR YAR, BUT THIS YARG CONCERN HAS EBBED IN LAST YEAR. YARG NOW MORE CONFIDENT THAN EVER BEFORE OF SAUDI RELATIONSHIP, AND SEES GREATER
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RISKS IN CONFRONTATION WITH RADICAL PDRY THAN IN RAPPROACHMENT. YAR CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED HOWEVER, AT GROWING RADICALIZATION IN ERITREA, SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA, PARTICULARLY WHEN RADICAL ELEMENTS STILL IN DRIVER'S SEAT IN SOUTH YEMEN AND WHEN THERE ARE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL DISORDER AND REGIONAL CONFLICT AFTER DJIBOUTI INDEPENDENCE.

5. IN LIGHT OF EVENTS OF LAST SIX MONTHS WE NOW SEE US INTERESTS IN YEMEN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY THAN IN SANA A-15:

A) OUR INTEREST YEMEN DERIVES LARGELY FROM OUR INTEREST IN SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH IS VITAL TO US. DURING 60'S YEMEN WAS MILITARY AND POLITICAL THREAT TO SAUDIS. AT THAT TIME WE ACTED, AS SECURITY

PARTNER TO SAUDIS, TO BUTTRESS INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF KINGDOM. TODAY KINGDOM IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AS MODERATE VOICE IN ARAB COULCILS RE MIDEAST SETTLEMENT AND OIL. US ROLE AS SECURITY PARTNER CONTINUES AS VITAL PROP AND QUID PRO QUO FOR SAUDI MODERATION. OUR ROLE IN YEMEN HAS HELPED ELIMINATE RADICAL THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA FROM YEMEN, AND MAKE NORTH YEMEN BOTH BUFFER AGAINST AND STALKING HORSE IN THE STILL RADICAL SOUTH. US ROLE IN YAR THUS HAS IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL SECURITY IN CORNER OF PENINSULA WHERE WAR OF LIBERATION STILL RAGES IN DHOFAR AND WHERE SUBVERSION COULD INTENSIFY AGAIN IN SOUTHERN YAR. NEVERTHELESS, OUR ROLE IS FACILITORY AND SUPPORTIVE, AND WE AIM AT DEVELOPING LARGER ROLES FOR OTHERS--SAUDIS, JORDANIANS, IRANIANS--RATHER THAN CRUCIAL DIRECT ROLE FOR OURSELVES. ROLE WE PLAY THUS SERVES OUR INTEREST IN PROMOTING REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND WE CAN PLAY THIS ROLE BETTER THAN ANY OTHER OF RIVAL OR INEXPERIENCED MIDEAST STATES WHICH CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN YEMEN.

B) YEMEN HAS POTENTIAL ROLE OF SOME IMPORTANCE IN PENINSULA. ITS POPULATION IS ABOUT HALF THAT OF PENINSULA AND ITS MILLION AND A HALF IMMIGRANT WORKERS PRVIDE VIATL LABOR BASE FOR VAST DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE NOW PLANNED AND UNDERWAR IN PENINSULA. IN ADDITION THIS POSITIVE ROLE, YEMENI WORKERS COULD PLAY NEGATIVE ROLE OF SUBVERSIVES IF YARG FALLS UNDER EXTREMIST CONTROL AGAIN.

C) A-15 DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY EMPHASIZE INTEREST WE HAVE PURSUED HERE IN REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN YEMEN, WHERE SOVIETS
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ONCE INTRODUCED FIGHTER PILOTS FOR COMBAT MISSIONS AGAINST ROYALISTS. EIGHT YEARS LATER SOVIET MILITARY MISSION APPEARS TO BE ON ITS WAY TO UNCEREMONIOUS EXIT. SOVIET PRESTIGE IN OTHER AREAS--AS EDUCATOR, SOURCE OF ECONOMIC AID, ADVISOR IN MIDEAST CONFLICT--HAS ALL DWINDLED CONCURRENT WITH GROWTH OF US AND OTHER WESTERN MODERATE ARAB PRESENCE HERE AND IN MEDEAST GENERALLY. SOVIETS FEAR--RIGHTLY WE THINK-- SAME FATE IS IN STORE FOR THEM IN PDRY. IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE THIS TREND IN STRATEGIC MARITIME NEXUS OF RED SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN, PARTICULARLY IN FACE OF NEW SOVIET NAVAL POWER AND SUCCESSES OF RADICALS IN HORN OF AFRICA.

D) TO PARAGRAPH IN A-15 ON US INTEREST IN YEMENI DEVELOPMENT WE WOULD ONLY ADD THAT YEMEN, AS ONE OF POOREST COUNTRIES IN WORLD, FITS CONGRESSIONAL AID MANDATES PERFECTLY.

E) IN CONTRAST TO SANA A-15, WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT NOW SAY THAT FREE NAVIGATION OF RED SND AND BAB AL-MANEB IS MAJOR US INTEREST IN YEMEN. IT IS CLEARLY MAJOR AREA INTEREST, BUT IT NOT RPT NOT LIKELY BE INFLUENCED BY ANYTHING WE DO HERE OR WHICH YARG DOES. YEMEN CAN DO LITTLE TO INTERFERE WITH NAVIGATION. PRACTICABLY SPEAKING, NAVIGATION AND LOS QUESTIONS ARE OF GREATER IMPORTANCE

TO US IN OTHER LITTORAL STATES OF RED SEA THAN IN YEMEN.

5. GOALS--SANA A-15 IDENTIFIED THREE GENERAL GOALS. WE PREFER THE FOLLOWING MORE SPECIFIC GOALS.

A) US MUST CONTINUE PROMOTE SAUDI-YEMENI REGIONAL OCCUPATION IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AID, AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE SPHERES. SAG MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO FURTHER CONCRETIZE APPROACH TOWARDS YEMEN AS GENUINE PARTNER AND TO DISSIPATE REMAINING VESTIGES OF CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. SIMILARLY, INTERDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO INSURE SAUDIS WILL NOT PERCEIVE YAR AS POTENTIAL THREAT, BUT RATHER SEE IT AS LEVER FOR MOVING PDRY TOWARD MODERATION AND COOPERATION.

B) US SHOULD OFFER ITSELF IN SUPPORT OF ABOVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO SIVIET UNION. GOAL IS FURTHER DIMINUTION SOVIET INDLUENCE IN YAR AND PDRY.

C) CONTINUED PROMOTION ORDERLY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BY US AND
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OTHER FRIENDLY STATES TO ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY WITHIN YEMEN AND AS AN ALTERNATIVE WHICH WILL HASTEN TO MODERATION IN SOUTH YEMEN AND IF POSSIBLE, IN OTHER PARTS OF THE HORN.

6. THERE HAS TO BE SOME REFOCUS IN OUR SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES AS STATED IN SANA A-15.

A) CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HAMDI REGIME. WE DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE TO TAKE ANY STEPS TO MAKE SURE HAMDI IS FUNCTIONING IN CONSENSUS WITH SAUDI-SUPPORTED CONSERVATIVES. HAMDI HAS COME TO DOMINATE YEMEN POLITICS, WITH SAUDI BLESSING AND ASSISTANCE. HE DEALS WITH THEM DIRECTLY, AS DO LEADERS IN OTHER MIDEAST NATION-STATES.

B) WITH OTHER LARGE AID DONORS IN PICTURE NOW, PRESSURE IS OFF US TO PROVIDE VISIBLE US CAPITAL ASSISTANCE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM. TREND IS DEFINITELY TOWARDS AID PROJECTS IN 1) RURAL AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, 2) MANPOWER TRAINING, AND 3) POTABLE WATER SYSTEMS OR IMPROVEMENT OF HEALTH FOR POPULATION CENTERS ARE KEYS TO LONG TERM YAR INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT. AID MUST ALSO STRESS INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THESE GHREE FIELDS. PROBLEM IS HOW FAST AND HOW FAR TO SHIFT AID OPERATIONS TO THIS LONG TERM STRATEGY FROM INTERIM STRATEGY UNDER WHICH AID, AFTER RESUMPTION HERE, WAS UNDER POLITICAL REQUIREMENTLRL O CONTRIBUTE QUICKLY TO VISIBLE US PRESENCE. ANSWER IS PARTLY IN NEED TO DEFINE WORKABLE PROJECTS AND PARTLY IN SPEED WITH WHICH ARMS SALES PROGRAM HERE MATERIALIZES TO TAKE PRESSURE OFF AID OPERATIONS.

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C) CONTINUE TO URGE SAUDI ARABIA TO AGREE WITH YAR
ON BROAD-SCALE PROGRAM TO REORGANIZE AND REEQUIP YAR ARMED
FORCES WITH DESPATCH.

7. KEY POLICY ISSUES--WE HAVE LITTLE TO ADD TO SANA A-15
IN THIS SECTION.

A) ONE CLEAR ADDITIONAL TRENT NOTICEABLE IN YEMEN IS SHIFT
OF BALANCE OF INTERNAL POWER FROM NORTHERN ZAYDI TRIBES TO
MORE MODERNIST SOUTHERN SHAFATI ELITES. THIS IS TRENT WE
CAN ACCEPT.

B) YEMEN CONTINUES RELY ON US AND SAUDI ARABIA FOR
URGENTLY NEEDED MILITARY PROGRAM WHICH FOLLOWS PRIORITIES SET
IN TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT BY US AND SAUDI STUDIES. US SHOULD
LOOK BEYOND ITS PROFFERED "IMPACT" PACKAGE--WHICH ACTUALLY
PROVIDES VERY LITTLE IMPACT--TO LONGER TERM DELIVERY
NEEDS OF YEMEN, AND DETERMINE WHETHER TO ATTEMPT TO
SUPPLY THIS COUNTRY OURSELVES OR HASTEN YEMENI SHIFT
FROM SOVIET ARMS BY DRAWING IN OTHER WESTERN SUPPLIERS IN
COORDINATED FASHION. WE BELIEVE LATTER IS BEST COURSE,
SIMPLY BECAUSE IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL US INVENTORIES AND
PRODUCTION WILL ALLOW US BE VERY RESPONSIVE IN SHORT
RUN TO SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR MILITARY PROGRAM
ENVISIONED HERE.

C) BILATERAL US AID SHOULD CONTINUE TO GROW. WHILE FEW
CAPITAL ASSISTANCE LOANS SHOULD BE ENVISIONED, PROGRAM
SHOULD REFLECT CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AID PRIORITIES IN
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AREAS SUCH AS RURAL DEVELOPMENT, WATER RESOURCES, MANPOWER
DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURE.

8. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO PROJECT STAFFING AND

FUNDING REQUIREMENTS--SHOULD US-PDRY RELATIONS SUBSTANTIVELY IMPROVE IN NEAR FUTURE, APPEARS PROBABLE US MAY REESTABLISH RESIDENT MISSION AT ADEN WITH SMALL AID PROGRAM. EMBASSY FEELS THAT ANY MOVE THIS DIRECTION SHOULD BE TEMPERED BY THE RECOGNITION THAT BULK OF US INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN ARABIAN PENINSULA WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN NORTH YEMEN WHICH REMAINS THE POLITICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL FOCAL POINT OF THE AREA AND WILL BE INSTRUMENTAL IN ENCOURAGING FURTHER MODERATE TRENDS IN SOUTH YEMEN.

A) AS NOTED REF B, US SHOULD HAVE LARGE AND CONSPICUOUS--BUT NOT SOLITARY--ROLE IN FUNDING YAR'S LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS DESPITE PRIMARY ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES BY NEIGHBORING STATES. THIS MAY CALL FOR MAP ASSISTANT IN DAO'S OFFICE, AND SPECIAL EFFORTS BY DOD TO PLAN, DELIVER AND SUPPORT NEW EQUIPMENT.

B) ACCELERATE APPROVAL OF AID PROJECTS IN 1) TROPICAL AND SUB-TROPICAL HORTICULTURE, 2) RURAL DEVELOPMENT, 3) WATER SYSTEMS FOR REGIONAL MARKETING CENTERS, 4) EXPANSION OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND 5) IMPLEMENTATION OF SMALL (70,000 MT PER ANNUM) PL-480 TITLE I COMMODITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. AID PERSONNEL SHOULD GROW SLOWLY IN NEXT YEAR, HOWEVER, TO ALLOW RECENT GROWTH TO BE FULLY UTILIZED.

C) TITLE II--GIVEN PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTERING THIS PROGRAM, WE THINK IT SHOULD DECLINE BUT ONLY RPT ONLY AS TITLE I PROGRAM MATERIALIZES.

D) VOLUNTARY AGENCIES--ESPECIALLY THE PEACE CORPS BUT ALSO PRIVATE CHURCH GROUPS AND OTHERS LIKE IVS--CAN PLAN AN INVALUABLE ROLE IN YEMEN IN SUPPLYING MIDDLE LEVEL TECHNICIANS TO STRUGGLING YEMENI INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE, HEALTH AND EDUCATION. YEMEN IS A GOOD COUNTRY FOR VOLUNTEERS IF THEY ARE GIVEN THE PROPER SUPPORT AND PLACED IN WELL-DESIGNED PROGRAMS. INDIVIDUALS CAN THEN MAKE A VERY LARGE IMPACT. AID IS THEREFORE DESIGNING ITS RURAL AND AGRICULTURAL
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DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WITH VOLUNTEERS IN MIND, AND WE SEE GOOD REASONS GRADUALLY TO EXPAND VOLUNTEER NUMBERS IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

E) US MUST PAY MORE ATTENTION TO MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS, BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND THIRD COUNTRIES AND IN YEMEN. US CONTRIBUTION TO THIS VITAL FIELD PRESENTLY MUCH
RPT MUCH TOO SMALL BOTH IN RELATION YEMENI
NEEDS AND US
RESOURCES. US-SAUDI JOINT COMMISSION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE USED TO DEVELOP TRAINING PROGRAMS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT TO BOTH YAR AND SAUDI ARABIA. AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF

ARMY IS CONSIDERABLE, GROWING MAP TRAINING FUNDS MUST ALSO BE DEVOTED TO DEVELOPMENT SIZEABLE US MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE ARMY AS MODERATE BUT PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENT. FINALLY, CU AND AID FUNDS FOR TRAINING AND EDUCATION SHOULD BE EXPANDED MARKEDLY.

F) MANPOWER TRAINING CANNOT EXPAND AS DRAMATICALLY AS WE THINK ADVISABLE IF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM RUN BY USIS DOES NOT ALSO EXPAND. BOTH AID AND USIS SHOULD PLAN TO INCREASE FUNDING OF THIS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM, WHICH IS PREPARING CAREFULLY PICKED GRADUATES FOR FURTHER STUDIES IN US INSTITUTCBNS.

G) AID SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO LAUNCH A SERIES OF FEASIBILITY STUDIES. FUNDS ARE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE FOR THIS, BUT IT IS A SUFFICIENTLY HIGH PRIORITY IN MANPOWER-POOR YEMEN THAT MORE FUNDS SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IF ENOUGH SUITABLE SUBJECTS CAN BE IDENTIFIZE.

H) IN WELFARE FIELD, MISSION MEMBERS WILL SOON PASS 50 EMPLOYEES (FOR TOTAL, WITH DEPENDENTS, OF OVER 120 PERSONS, NOT COUNTING 27 PCV'S). THIS MAKES SANA ONE OF LARGER MIDDLE EAST POSTS. SEVERE PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND GRISLY LOCAL HEALTH FACILITIES MAKE A RESIDENT MD A POST NECESSITY. DOCTOR COULD SERVICE JIDDA, PERHAPS GULF STATES AS EASILY, AS PRESENT MD IN KUWAIT.

I) IN ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS, LOCAL POSITIONS MUST INCREASE
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TO ALLOW US ATTRACT, RETAIN QUALIFIED PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOW HIRED UNDER DESIRABLE CONTRACTS. ALSO, WITH PAST AND PROJECTED GROWTH IN MISSION, INFLATION AND PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS IN LOCAL ECONOMY, WE CANNOT ABSORB PROJECTED FY 76 S&E COST, WHICH TAKE US BELOW ACTUAL FY 75 COSTS.
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